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NOTES
GETTING "SMART": CRAFTING ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS THAT RESPECT ALL HUMAN
RIGHTS
Amy Howlett*
INTRODUCTION
The international human rights idea is not monolithic, but rather is
subject to deep internal divisions and controversy. A particularly
long-standing controversy exists between countries, human rights
advocates, and scholars who favor economic, social, and cultural
human rights-mainly positive rights,' such as the right to food, the
right to work, and the right to adequate health care'-and those that
favor civil and political human rights'-mainly negative rights,4 such
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law, Notes & Articles Editor,
Fordham Law Review. I would like to thank Professor Catherine Powell for her
feedback and assistance; Mehlika Hoodbhoy for inspiring me to write about
economic, social, and cultural rights; and my family and friends for their
unconditional support.
1. These rights are generally thought of as entitlement or positive rights
requiring state action, but, in reality, they also contain negative analogues that
prohibit state action. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (explaining that
ESC rights, though often thought of as purely positive, also contain negative
elements). For example, the right to health requires states to not only take steps by
passing relevant legislation or allocating funds to ensure access to quality health care
(a positive right), but it also prohibits states from making commissions inconsistent
with right to health guarantees by, for example, discriminating with respect to access
to health care (a negative right). See The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of
Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), U.N. ESCOR, 22d-24th Sess., Supp. No. 2, CESCR
General Comment 14, at $1 1, 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2004/4 (2001) [hereinafter
General Comment 14]; see also The Nature of State Parties Obligations (Art.2, Para. 1
of the Covenant), U.N. ESCOR 5th Sess., CESCR General Comment 3, at 1, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1990/4 (1990) [hereinafter General Comment 3].
2. See infra Part I.A.2 (describing the rights protected by the principal
international document regarding economic, social, and cultural rights).
3. See Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties'
Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 9 Hum. Rts. 0. 156, 158 (1987) ("[T]he debate remains at least as polarized
today as it ever was in the days when the international community had yet to
recognize formally the legitimacy of economic, social, and cultural rights...
demonstrated in part by the number of commentators who continue to contest the
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as the right to liberty, freedom of thought, and freedom of expression
(more U.S.-centric rights).5
The use of economic sanctions by the United States to achieve
human rights goals abroad illustrates this divide.6 The United States
has imposed economic sanctions to punish violations of civil and
political human rights abroad with increasing frequency in recent
years.7  This increased use has contributed to establishing
international human rights norms8 indicating that the behavior of the
sanctioned country-usually violations of civil and political rights-is
unacceptable under international law.9 But where economic sanctions
cause severe human suffering, they jeopardize the economic, social,
and cultural rights ("ESC rights") of civilians living inside the
sanctioned country by, for example, destroying jobs, contributing to
poor health conditions, and increasing hunger and poverty." Thus,
the same sanctions that are imposed to end human rights violations of
a civil and political nature are causing human rights violations of an
economic, social, and cultural nature, in the same country."
status of those rights...."); Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S.
Economic Sanctions, 26 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 29 (2001) ("Western industrial nations...
generally emphasize civil and political rights, and developing countries... often place
greater emphasis on economic development."). Many countries of the world have
included economic, social, and cultural rights in their constitutions. See Alston &
Quinn, supra, at 170 (citing the constitutions of Switzerland, Portugal, Greece,
Sweden, Spain, and the Netherlands). Notably, the post-Apartheid constitution of
South Africa includes comprehensive ESC rights. Mark S. Kende, The South African
Constitutional Court's Construction of Socio-Economic Rights: A Response to Critics,
19 Conn. J. Int'l L. 617, 617 (2004).
4. See Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights 323-24 (1999). Just as economic,
social, and cultural rights are not solely positive, civil and political rights are not solely
negative. Id. For example,
a number of the rights articulated apply in the criminal process, by which a
state may legitimately take liberty and property... in punishment, but in
those cases the state is required not merely to leave the individual alone but
"positively" to organize itself, by institutions and laws, to assure against
arbitrary detention, and to provide due process, fair trial, and humane
punishment.
Id.; see also Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign
Policy 35-40 (1980) (critiquing the description of the dichotomy between the two sets
of rights as a positive/negative divide). Indeed, many economic, social, and cultural
rights have a negative analogue. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; infra notes
55-57 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part I.A.1 (describing the rights protected by the principal
international document regarding political and civil rights); Part I.B (describing the
U.S. preference for civil and political rights).
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part III.A.1.
10. See infra Parts II.A.1-5 (describing the ramifications of sanctions on the
population-at-large of the target country); Part III.A.2 (placing these violations under
the lens of ESC rights).
11. See infra Part III.A.2.
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This Note examines this schizophrenic role of economic sanctions in
international human rights law, 12 focusing on the United States'
frequent use of economic sanctions.13 It reconciles the tension
between scholars who argue sanctions violate international human
rights law, 14 and those who argue sanctions bolster international
human rights law 5 by framing the tension as a conflict between ESC
rights and civil and political rights.16 From this new perspective,
sanctions do build up norms, but norms that favor civil and political
human rights while undermining ESC rights.17
This effect is incongruous with international human rights law,
which is predicated on the idea that human rights are universal." U.S.
unilateral sanctions deprive international human rights law of this
universality. They contribute to civil and political human rights norms
favored by the United States at the expense of ESC rights favored by
many other nations, and recognized on equal footing with civil and
political rights in international human rights law. 9
As a solution, the United States should only impose economic
sanctions when it can be sure sanctions will not jeopardize ESC rights,
through the use of narrowly tailored "smart" sanctions." Sanctions
legislation should also be drafted with a nod toward ESC rights by
phrasing violations in rights-based language that clearly implicates
ESC rights rather than merely citing civil and political violations as
impetus for sanctions.2
12. See Richard N. Haass, Introduction to Economic Sanctions and American
Diplomacy 1 (Richard N. Haass ed., 1998) ("The widespread use of economic
sanctions constitutes one of the great paradoxes of contemporary American foreign
policy. Sanctions are frequently criticized [for not working] .... At the same time,
economic sanctions are fast becoming the policy tool of choice for the United
States .. ")
13. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
19. See Henkin et al., supra note 4, at 323-24; see also International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 [hereinafter ICCPR]
("[W]hereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic,
social and cultural rights."); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 933 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 [hereinafter ICESCR] ("[T]he ideal of free
human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural
rights, as well as his civil and political rights."); Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno &
Tracy Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational Corporations and the Protection of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1663, 1671
(2004) ("ESC rights are fully a part of international law, and have been established
and described in numerous international and regional treaties ... ").
20. See infra Part III.B.1; see also infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text
(describing "smart" sanctions).
21. See infra Part III.B.2.
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Part I describes relevant aspects of international human rights law:
sources of international human rights law, how international law is
developed, and the use of economic sanctions to enforce violations of
human rights law. Part II provides an overview of the scholarly
debate surrounding economic sanctions. Part II.A presents the view
that economic sanctions are inhumane measures that jeopardize
human rights, and Part II.B presents the seemingly contradictory
position that economic sanctions enhance respect for international
human rights law. Finally, Part III.A, through the use of several case
studies, illustrates how both sides to the debate are, to a certain
degree, correct. Economic sanctions do strengthen civil and political
human rights norms, but they do so at the expense of ESC rights. To
reconcile this problem, Part III.B recommends imposing sanctions for
violations of ESC rights as well as for violations of civil and political
rights, and only imposing sanctions when the ESC rights of civilians
living in the target country will not be violated in the process through
the use of "smart" sanctions.22
In order to understand these recommendations, the Part I provides
background information on international human rights law and
economic sanctions. Part I.A discusses the primary international
human rights documents with regard to civil and political, and ESC
rights. Part I.B describes the U.S. aversion to ESC rights despite the
universal and interrelated nature of both sets of rights under
international law. It also looks into the territorial scope of ESC versus
civil and political rights, which is important to examine in light of the
extraterritorial quality of economic sanctions. After this overview of
the primary documents' scope and substance, Part I.C describes
uncodified sources of international human rights law-customary
international law-and how such sources are developed through state
practice. Finally, Part I.D looks into enforcement of international
human rights through economic sanctions and introduces several
economic sanctions case studies that will be used throughout this
Note.
I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS IDEA AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW
The human rights idea blossomed in the wake of World War 11.23
Appalled by the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany, the world
community responded by establishing the United Nations and
enacting seminal human rights treaties. 4 Over time, the international
human rights idea grew and evolved into a complex web of laws
22. Other scholars have made this recommendation to use "smart" sanctions, but
none, as far as my research has uncovered, has done so in the context of the
dichotomy between civil and political and ESC rights. See infra notes 104-06.
23. Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights 1-5 (1990).
24. Id.
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comprised of treaties, customary international law, and general
principles.25 The fountainhead of international human rights law, the
International Bill of Rights, is described below. 26
A. The International Bill of Rights
The International Bill of Rights includes the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights ("UDHR"), the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 27 The UDHR
does not require ratification and was intended to be a normative
instrument, whereas the two covenants, which entered into force
almost thirty years later, were intended to be binding and thus require
ratification. 8
The UDHR was proclaimed, and shortly thereafter states began
drafting the two covenants.29 The UDHR provides the scope for the
two subsequent charters-it encompasses civil and political rights as
well as ESC rights.30 The two subsets of human rights were not
designated as such by the UDHR, but were bifurcated at the behest of
western nations, especially the United States.3' The rationale for
bifurcation was that the two sets stemmed from different theoretical
backgrounds, requiring different language and steps to articulate and
ensure their protection.32
1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR33  contains mainly negative rights (actions the
government cannot take against you).34 Examples include: the right
to life,35 the right to be free from slavery and forced labor,36 the right
to liberty,37 and the right to a fair and public hearing by an impartial
25. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102
(1987).
26. Henkin et al., supra note 4, at 73 (noting there is no document actually called
The International Bill of Rights, rather it refers to three documents considered
together-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR, and the
ICCPR).
27. Id.
28. See Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values 177-78, 186-88 (1995)
[hereinafter Henkin, International Law].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. ICCPR, supra note 19,999 U.N.T.S. at 171.
34. Bryan P. Wilson, State Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial
Activism: Is the Big Sky Falling?, 53 Emory L.J., 627, 635 (2004). But see supra note 4.
35. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 6(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
36. Id. art. 8, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
37. Id. art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
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tribunal.38  Rights protected by the ICCPR are immediately
enforceable, and state parties must "adopt such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized"
by the covenant. 39 The United States, along with 151 other states, is a
party to the ICCPR.4 °
2. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights
While the United States has not ratified the ICESCR, 150 nations
are a party to the covenant.4 Therefore, roughly the same number of
countries has ratified the ICESCR as the ICCPR. Nonetheless, while
many human rights advocates instinctively accept civil and political
human rights as fundamental to human existence, ESC rights have
struggled to gain acceptance as fundamental rights.42
38. Id. art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
39. Id. art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
40. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treaty6.a
sp (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
41. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treaty5.a
sp (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
42. See Alston & Quinn, supra note 3, at 161 (arguing an "overriding concern"
should be "to breathe life into provisions that have all too often been derided as
meaningless simply because of their complexity and relative open-endedness"); see
also Adrienne Germain, Reproductive Health and Human Rights, 363 Lancet 65, 65
(2004) (discussing the neglect of the right to health); Paul Hunt, Neglected Diseases,
Social Justice and Human Rights: Some Preliminary Observations 2 (2003) (Health
and Human Rights Working Paper Series, No. 4), at
http://www.who.int/hhr/news/en/Series_4_neglected %20diseases.social-j ustice-huma
n-rights%20PaulHunt.pdf.
[Mlany people do not grasp that [the right to health-an economic and
social right] is a fundamental human right. They feel intuitively that a right
to a fair trial and freedom of expression are human rights, but they do not
instinctively regard the right to health as a human right. In other words, the
right to health has not yet gained the same human rights currency as more
established rights.
Id. See Mary Ann Torres, The Human Right to Health, National Courts, and Access to
HIV/AIDS Treatment: A Case Study from Venezuela, 3 Chi. J. of Int'l L. 105, 105
(2002) (discussing the neglect of the right to health). This is unfortunate because
many ESC rights are foundational rights on which civil and political rights depend.
See General Comment 14, supra note 1, 11 (addressing this specifically with regard to
the right to health). How can one enjoy liberty or free speech, for example, without
adequate food or health? See Pierre de Vos, Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable
Human Rights?: Social and Economic Rights in South Africa's 1996 Constitution,
1997 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 67, 71 ("Starving people may find it difficult to exercise their
freedom of speech..."); Human Rights Res. Ctr., Circle of Rights, Module 1:
Developing a Rights Based Perspective, at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/toc.htm (last visited Apr. 27,
2004).
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The ICESCR, unlike the ICCPR, includes mainly positive rights
(things the government must do for you).43 These rights include the
right to work and receive remuneration,44 the right to form trade
unions,45 the right to an adequate standard of living and its continuous
improvement,46 the right to food,47 the right to the highest attainable
standard of health,48 and the right to education.49 It also affords
special protection for mothers before and after childbirth 5° and for
children from exploitation and child labor.5' ESC rights differ from
civil and political rights in two significant ways.
a. Difficulty in Assessing Positive Rights Violations
First, because ESC rights are positive, it is more difficult to asses
whether an ESC right has been violated.52 When has a government
done enough to give effect to an ESC right? To oversimplify, must it
merely make food available by building a healthy economy that can
sustain grocery stores stocked with food, or must it go further and
actually deliver food to hungry individuals?53 Compare this with
negative civil and political rights where it is simply a government act
that constitutes a violation. 4
However, most ESC rights contain a negative element-a
prohibition on state action incompatible with ESC rights .5  These
negative aspects are therefore easier to assess like civil and political
rights. One specific application of this idea is the prohibition on
discrimination with regard to ESC rights. ICESCR Article 2(2)
provides that "rights... will be exercised without discrimination of
43. See ICESCR, supra note 19, 933 U.N.T.S. at 3. But see supra note 1; infra
notes 52-57 and accompanying text (describing the negative analogues of ESC rights).
44. ICESCR, supra note 19, arts. 6-7, 933 U.N.T.S. at 6.
45. Id. art. 8, 933 U.N.T.S. at 6.
46. Id. art. 11, 933 U.N.T.S. at 6.
47. Id. art. 11(2), 933 U.N.T.S. at 6.
48. Id. art. 12, 933 U.N.T.S. at 8.
49. Id. art. 13, 933 U.N.T.S. at 8.
50. Id. art. 10(2), 933 U.N.T.S. at 7.
51. Id. art. 10(3), 933 U.N.T.S. at 7.
52. See Alston & Quinn, supra note 3, at 159 ("[CJivil and political rights are
characterized as negative in that they require only that governments should abstain
from activities that would violate them.. . [whereas] [e]conomic, social, and cultural
rights require active intervention on the part of governments ....").
53. Cf. id. at 166-68 (discussing the difficulty of determining what measures are
sufficient with regard to ESC rights).
54. See supra note 52.
55. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. This negative element is expressed
most generally through the idea that states must "respect" all ESC rights. Human
Rights Res. Ctr., Circle of Rights, Module 8: Defining the Context of ESC Rights, at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/toc.htm (last visited Aug. 14,
2004). The obligation to respect "requires States to refrain from interfering directly
or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health [an ESC right]." General
Comment 14, supra note 1, 33.
2004] 1205
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any kind .... 56 The most broadly sweeping expression of the
prohibition on interference with ESC rights is the staunch prohibition
on retrogressive measures-states cannot backslide with regard to
ESC rights.57
b. Progressive Realization
Second, whereas ICCPR rights are immediately enforceable, 8
under the ICESCR, states are obligated merely to "take steps" toward
"full realization" of ESC rights.59 States, however, cannot make ad
infinitum arguments that doing nothing is justified in the name of
progressive realization.60 On the contrary, steps must be taken almost
immediately even if complete realization of the right can be achieved
progressively.61 Specifically with regard to health rights, states must
take steps "immediate[ly]," and "such steps must be deliberate,
concrete and targeted."62
B. The United States and ESC Rights
The United States is not a party to the ICESCR, and for the most
part, U.S. policy has opposed giving ESC rights equal footing with
civil and political rights.63 Delegates of the United States have made
public statements that it would be hard for the United States to accept
ESC rights because they go beyond rights the U.S. Constitution
56. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
57. General Comment 3, supra note 1, T 9 ("[Any deliberately retrogressive
measures.., would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully
justified .... ").
58. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. But see Alston & Quinn,
supra note 3, at 172 (taking issue with "[c]ommentators invariably contrast[ing] the
concept of progressive achievement with that of immediate implementation which is
said to be required by Article 2 of the [ICCPR]"). Alston and Quinn conclude that,
in reality, "the full realization of civil and political rights is heavily dependant both on
the availability of resources and the development of the necessary societal
structures." Id.
59. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. However, over time,
some ESC rights are no longer subject to progressive realization, but are also
immediately enforceable. General Comment 14, supra note 1 (discussing the
minimum core ESC rights from which no State can derogate).
60. Cf. Henkin et al., supra note 4, at 329 ("Despite what some might describe as
the 'softness' of the undertakings in the ICESCR... they were designed to establish,
and did establish, legally binding obligations.").
61. See General Comment 3, supra note 1, T 2. Comment 3 requires states to take
steps within a "reasonably short time" of entry into force. Id. Thirty years later, this
arguably means now.
62. General Comment 14, supra note 1, 30. ESC rights also have immediacy to
the extent they are included in the "minimum core obligation," rights that are no
longer subject to progressive realization but form a baseline from which states cannot
deviate. General Comment 3, supra note 1, T 10 ("[A] minimum core obligation to
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the
rights is incumbent upon every State party.").
63. See Alston & Quinn, supra note 3, at 158.
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encompasses.64  The United States Constitution contains mainly
negative rights similar to those found in the ICCPR.6 5
In general, the United States has done little with regard to ESC
rights, as is partially evidenced by the United States' continued failure
to ratify the ICESCR, the primary international document for
protecting ESC rights.66 And according to Philip Alston and Gerard
Quinn, "[s]ince 1981 the United States has maintained that economic,
social, and cultural rights belong in a 'qualitatively different category'
from other rights, that they should be seen not as rights but as goals of
"167economic and social policy ....
This was not always the case. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
New Deal was a high point for ESC rights in the United States.
Roosevelt's 1944 State of the Union address articulates this policy:
We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which
a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for
all regardless of station, race, or creed.
Among these are:
The right to a useful and remunerative job...;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing...;
The right ... to a decent home...;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve
and enjoy good health; [and]
The right to a good education;
64. See Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 32, 41-43 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
65. Cf. Louis Henkin, Introduction to The International Bill of Rights: The
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 10 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (describing the
rights included in the ICCPR "in terms of the individual's rights," whereas the
ICESCR "speaks only to the states," requiring them to take steps).
66. Id.
67. Alston & Quinn, supra note 3, at 158; see also Statement to the World
Conference on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 83, U.N. Doc.
E/1993/22/ (1993) ("[Tlhe international community as a whole continue[s] to tolerate
all too often breaches of economic, social and cultural rights which, if they occurred in
relation to civil and political rights, would provoke expressions of horror and
outrage....").
12072004]
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All of these rights spell security. And after this is won, we must be
prepared to move forward, in the implementation of these rights, to
new goals of human happiness and well-being.
68
In addition, Eleanor Roosevelt played a pivotal role in the drafting of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ensuring the inclusion of
ESC rights.69 She also contributed to the drafting of the ICESCR.0
Although the United States is opposed to ESC rights and views
them as qualitatively different than civil and political rights, human
rights documents recognize the interrelated nature of the two sets of
rights and emphasize the importance of universal acceptance of all
human rights.7 The preambles to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR
recognize that neither set of rights can be protected in isolation, but
instead both are interdependent.72 The preamble to the ICCPR
"[r]ecogniz[es] that... the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil
and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his
civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural
rights."73
The preambles to both covenants also "[c]onsider[ ] the obligation
of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
freedoms... ."' And the UDHR proclaims: "[A] common
understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest
importance.... "7 5
Part .C discusses where states are obligated to protect human
rights, an important issue in light of the extraterritorial reach of
economic sanctions.
C. Territorial Scope of International Human Rights Law
The ICCPR specifically precludes extraterritorial application of its
obligations through Article 2(1): "Each State Party ... undertakes to
68. Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address of 1944 (Jan. 11, 1944), in
90 Cong. Rec. 55, 57 (1944).
69. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2001).
70. See U.N. ESCOR 8th Sess., 271st mtg. at 12, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/SR.271 (1952)
(comments of Mrs. Roosevelt, U.S.A.).
71. See infra notes 72-74.
72. See ICCPR, supra note 19, pmbl., 999 U.N.T.S. at 173; see also ICESCR, supra
note 19, pmbl., 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
73. ICCPR, supra note 19, preamble, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
74. Id.; see also ICESCR, supra note 19, pmbl., 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
75. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (emphasis added); see also Henkin, supra note
23, at 2 ("Human rights are universal: they belong to every human being in every
human society. They do not differ with geography or history, culture or ideology,
political or economic system, or stage of societal development.").
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respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant."76
The ICESCR, on the other hand, does not contain any extraterritorial
exclusion. Rather, it contains language that calls for international
cooperation to protect and ensure ESC rights.77 This is important
because economic sanctions are diplomatic measures that respond to
extraterritorial human rights abuses."
Thus, the ICCPR and ICESCR codify different territorial
applications of their respective rights. However, as Part I.D describes,
state obligations stem from sources other than those codified in
international treaties.
D. Norms of International Human Rights Law and Customary
International Law
When a country ratifies a covenant or treaty, it becomes bound to
uphold the rights in the treaty.79 But a country is also bound to
uphold certain rights, referred to as international human rights norms
or customary international law, even if the rights are not found in any
documents it has ratified." Certain rights achieve the status of
customary international law ("CIL") through "general and consistent"
state practice conducted with "a sense of legal obligation.""s  CIL
"creates obligations by each state to all other states," and is, therefore,
binding on all states.82 If a "significant number of important states"
do not participate in the state practice, it can "prevent a principle
from becoming general customary law."83
According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States ("Restatement"), the following rights have ripened
into CIL: "(a) genocide, (b) slavery or the slave trade, (c) the murder
or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged
arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g)
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights."84
76. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173 (emphasis added).
77. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
78. See infra Part I.E (describing economic sanctions).
79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art 18, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 336.
80. See Restatement, supra note 25, introductory note, at 18-19.
81. Id. § 102(2). International agreements may also create CIL when they are
widely ratified. Id. § 102(3).
82. Id. § 702.
83. Id. § 102 cmt. b. The relevant norm, however, could become part of
"particular customary law." Id.
84. Id. § 702. "The list is not necessarily complete, and is not closed .. " Id.
cmt. a. It is interesting to note that many of these rights are codified in the ICCPR,
and largely absent from the list are ESC rights. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing rights
enshrined in ICCPR); Part I.A.2 (discussing rights enshrined in the ICESCR).
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Other rights, through widespread consensus, become a higher
form of CIL, jus cogens norms, non-derogable norms that can be
modified only by subsequent jus cogens norms.86 Therefore, certain
rights, whether or not they have been codified in international human
rights documents, can bind states if the rights have ripened into CIL
through general and consistent practice or jus cogens norms through
the higher requirement of widespread consensus.
The reporters of the Restatement have described the kind of state
practice required to create CIL. Such practice includes
the incorporation of human rights provisions, directly or by
reference, in national constitutions and laws; invocation of human
rights principles in national policy, in diplomatic practice, in
international organization activities and actions; and other
diplomatic communications or actions by states reflecting the view
that certain practices violate international human rights law,
including condemnation and other adverse state reactions to
violations by other states.87
Part II.B presents arguments that economic sanctions are an
example of state practice. Part I.E provides more detail on the
technical aspects of international sanctions and their role as an
enforcement mechanism in international law.
E. Enforcement of Human Rights Violations Through Economic
Sanctions
When an international human right is violated, states and, in some
circumstances, individuals have recourse to various domestic,
regional, and international forums for enforcement, 8 such as the
International Criminal Court 9 and the International Court of
Justice.9" Unfortunately, there are significant barriers to international
human rights law enforcement, and overall, the enforcement arm of
international human rights law remains underdeveloped and often
impotent.9" In light of these barriers, countries and international
85. See Restatement, supra note 25, § 102 reporters' notes 6 ("[T]he norm...
must be 'accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole."' (quoting from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980,
art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334)).
86. Id. § 102(k).
87. Id. § 102 reporters' note 2.
88. See generally Henkin et al., supra note 4, at 489-769 (discussing the various
mechanisms available for enforcement of human rights).
89. However, "the United States' refusal to join the International Criminal
Court... indicate[s] that effective international judicial enforcement for even the
most fundamental human rights violations... may be years away." Cleveland, supra
note 3, at 3.
90. But as Sarah Cleveland notes, the ICJ "remains limited in its effectiveness."
Id.
91. See id. at 3-4.
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bodies have turned to economic sanctions to economically coerce
governments to comply with international human rights standards.92
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot,
in their comprehensive study of 116 sanctions regimes, define
economic sanctions as "the deliberate, government-inspired
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial
relations."93  Withdrawals of trade relations, known as "trade
sanctions," encompass embargoes (bans on exports to a target state)
and boycotts (bans on imports from a target state).94 Withdrawals of
foreign assistance are accordingly referred to as "financial
sanctions,"95 which include measures such as the freezing of
government assets, bans on loans from banks and international
lending institutions, and visa denials. Economic sanctions also can
include bans on foreign investment and denials of foreign aid.96
Sanctions literature refers to the primary country or organization
imposing sanctions as the "sender,"97 and the country on which
sanctions are imposed as the "target."98  The sender can be one
country acting alone (unilateral sanctions), a country acting in concert
with several other states (collective sanctions), or an international
organization such as the United Nations (multilateral sanctions).99
Senders employ sanctions with the assumption that the sanctions
will cause severe hardship within the target.'00 Traditionally, sanctions
have targeted countries,10' and thus the expected scenario is that the
population-at-large, experiencing severe hardship caused by sanctions,
will rise up against its leaders to demand change."°  In another
92. See id. ("In light of the limited possibilities for multilateral enforcement of
international norms, domestic law mechanisms.., have become increasingly
important. ... 'Unilateral' economic sanctions... have become one common
domestic enforcement mechanism...."); Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and
the International Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 33, 73 (2002).
93. 1 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, & Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy 2 (1990) [hereinafter Hufbauer
et al.].
94. Koenraad Van Brabant, Sanctions: The Current Debate: A Summary of
Selected Readings 5 (1999).
95. Id.
96. 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 36.
97. 1 Id. at 35.
98. 1 Id. at 36.
99. 1 Id. at 35-36.
100. Margaret P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement 120
(1980).
101. See Joy K. Fausey, Does the United Nations' Use of Collective Sanctions to
Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10 Conn. J. Int'l L.
193, 197 (1994) ("Economic sanctions typically are directed at the entire population of
a country.").
102. Id. at 197-99.
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scenario, the leaders acquiesce to the demands of sanctions out of
guilt. 03
More recently, "smart" sanctions have targeted only the individuals
responsible for the reprehensible behavior a sender wishes to punish,
such as terrorist groups or specific leaders, instead of entire
countries.0 The assumption here is that the leaders or elite members
of society affected by sanctions will demand or make changes to end
their own suffering. 05 To achieve these results, "smart" sanctions
could involve some form of limited financial sanctions such as visa
denials or freezing assets of targeted individuals.16
Part III.B presents "smart" sanctions as one part of the solution to
the tension in scholarship that Part II lays out. To illustrate this
controversy, this Note will utilize several case studies where the
United States, the most frequent user of economic sanctions, 107 has
used non-"smart" sanctions to achieve human rights goals abroad. In
fact, for human rights purposes alone, the United States has imposed
economic sanctions more than twenty times since World War I.10s
This Note explores United States sanctions against Poland, South
Africa, Iraq, Haiti, and Burma.' 9 These cases were chosen to provide
103. Id. at 199.
104. See Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing "Smart Sanctions" Azainst Terrorism
Wiselv. 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 957. 960 (2002): Craie Forcese. Globalizin2 Decencv:
Responsible Enzaeement in an Era of Economic Integration, 5 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev.
L.J. 1. 20 (2002): William H. Mever & Bovka Stefanova. Human Rights. the UN
Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 Cornell Int'l L.J. 501, 520 (2001); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Rogue Regimes and the Individualization of International Law, 36
New Enag. L. Rev. 815. 823 (2002). But see Eric S. O'Mallev. Destabilization Policv:
Lessons from Reagan on International Law. Revolutions and Dealing with Pariah
Nations. 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 319, 341 (2003) (noting some problems with "smart"
sanctions).
105. Cf Slaughter. supra note 104 ("If we mean to target government. we must
design sanctions that will in fact affect the lives of individual government officials.").
106. Cf Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions, in
Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts 274, 275 (Lori
Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993) (addressing several techniques being used to make
sanctions "smart") [hereinafter Damrosch, Civilian Impact]; Lori Fisler Damrosch,
The Collective Enforcement of International Norms Through Economic Sanctions, 8
Ethics & Int'l Aft. 59, 74 (1994) (same) [hereinafter Damrosch, Collective
Enforcement].
107. Cleveland, supra, note 3, at 4; 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 66-67.
108. This tally is based on the chart created by Hufbauer and his co-authors, supra
note 93, at 16-33. Several sanctions episodes that do not specifically list human rights
as a goal have been included in this tally because their goals are sufficiently human
rights related. Some examples are: sanctions against Rhodesia, imposed to promote
majority rule by black Africans; sanctions against the USSR, imposed to promote the
liberalization of the treatment of dissidents; sanctions against Poland, imposed to
persuade Poland to lift martial law and release dissidents; sanctions against China,
imposed in response to Tiananmen square; and sanctions against Iraq, imposed to
restore the legitimate government of Iraq. Id. at 20-27.
109. Id. Other examples include Sudan, China, Somalia, Rhodesia, Uganda, South
Korea, Chile, Kampuchea, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Paraguay, Guatemala, Argentina,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Brazil, the USSR, Bolivia, and Suriname. Id.
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a cross section of sanctions policies over time and from different
geographical regions. Each is fairly representative of U.S. sanctions
policy in general.
1. Poland
President Ronald Regan imposed economic sanctions against
Poland in 1981 to persuade Polish leaders to "free those in arbitrary
detention, to lift martial law, and to restore the internationally
recognized rights of the Polish people to free speech and
association." ' ° And, though not mentioned in the U.S. sanctions
legislation, the Polish government was violating other rights. For
example, Poland had outlawed the Solidarity labor union,"' and in
general, was not able to "meet the economic needs" of its people."2
2. South Africa
President Regan imposed limited sanctions against South Africa
starting in 1985, and then Congress, after overriding a Presidential
veto, imposed more comprehensive economic sanctions-the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 ("CAAA") -against
South Africa.'13 According to section 311 of the CAAA, the sanctions
would be lifted when South Africa released all political prisoners and
those detained without trial from prison, lifted the ban on democratic
political parties and the right to express political opinions, repealed
discriminatory measures, and made efforts to make the political
process more representative." 4
Similar to the situation in Poland, violations in South Africa were
more extensive than those mentioned in the U.S. sanctions legislation.
The discrimination caused by Apartheid permeated most aspects of
daily life in South Africa, such as work, culture, education, and access
to health care."' Despite such rampant discrimination, prior to
sanctions, South Africa had a dynamic economy on which other
110. 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 196 (quoting from President Reagan's 1981
Christmas address); see also Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanctions in
Contemporary Perspective 32-33 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter Doxey, International
Sanctions].
111. Doxey, International Sanctions, supra note 110, at 32; 1 Hufbauer et al., supra
note 93, at 196.
112. 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 196.
113. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086, 1100-01 (repealed 1993).
114. § 101(b), 100 Stat. at 1089; 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 236; see also
Neta C. Crawford, The Humanitarian Consequences of Sanctioning South Africa: A
Preliminary Assessment, in Political Gain and Civilian Pain 57, 57 (Thomas G. Weiss
et al. eds., 1997).
115. See Crawford, supra note 114, at 77 ("Because of the persistent poverty and
racial apartheid policies .... Asian, colored, and black populations have been denied
the same access to water, health care, food, fuel, shelter, and education as white South
Africans.").
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countries in the region depended, though seventy-five percent of its
wealth was concentrated in the hands of only twenty percent of the
population. 16
3. Iraq
On August 2, 1990, the United States imposed economic sanctions
on Iraq, which included a comprehensive trade ban and a ban on
financial relationships with Iraq."7 The United Nations also imposed
economic sanctions on Iraq later that year with U.N. Security Council
Resolution 661, calling upon member states to impose trade and
financial sanctions against Iraq."8 The goal of the U.N. sanctions
against Iraq was to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait,
which Iraq had recently invaded."9 The U.S. sanctions shared this
goal, and in addition, were imposed to "condemn[ ] ... gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights in Kuwait,
including widespread arrests, torture, summary executions, and mass
extrajudicial killings." '  And though not mentioned in either
sanctions policy, human rights organizations were concerned at the
time with Saddam Hussein's gassing of Kurdish civilians at Halabja
where, according to Human Rights Watch, "most likely tens of
thousands-of civilians were killed during chemical and conventional
bombardments stretching from the spring of 1987 through the fall of
1988."'21
Despite these brutal acts against the Kurds, Iraq, prior to sanctions,
"was a relatively prosperous nation with a sophisticated health and
welfare system ... and ample food and water."'2  Eric Hoskins has
assessed pre-sanctions Iraq as follows:
Iraq's investment in its own economic and social development had a
visible effect on the living conditions and health status of the civilian
population. Iraq's medical facilities and public health system were
well developed .... By 1990, nearly all urban dwellers and 72
percent of rural residents had access to clean water, while 93 percent
of Iraqis had access to health services.1
23
116. Id. at 61.
117. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, 101 Pub. L. No. 513, 104 Stat. 2047 (1990)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)); see also 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93. at 283.
118. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990); see also Geoff Simons, The Scourging of Iraq 35 (1986) (discussing the
sanctions).
119. See 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 290; see also Eric D. K. Melby, Iraq, in
Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, supra note 12, at 107, 110.
120. § 586A(7), 14 Stat. at 2048.
121. Human Rights Watch, Whatever Happened to the Iraqi Kurds? (1991),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/iraq/.
122. Simons, supra note 118, at 107; see also Crawford, supra note 114, at 57-90.
123. Eric Hoskins, The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in
Iraq, in Political Gain and Civilian Pain, supra note 114, at 92.
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4. Haiti
In 1991, President George H.W. Bush imposed economic sanctions
against Haiti, one of the most impoverished countries in the western
hemisphere. 124 The sanctions were aimed at forcing a military coup to
step aside and restoring the democratically elected leader, Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, to power. 125 In the words of Sarah Zaidi in her
assessment of the Haiti sanctions, "[t]he coup unleashed a campaign
of terror and repression ... including extrajudicial executions,
disappearances, torture, rape, limitations on freedom of association
and assembly, and disruption in personal and professional
activities. ,126
5. Burma
More recently, in 2003, the United States imposed sanctions on
Burma. 27 A host of other countries and organizations have joined the
United States by imposing sanctions on Burma in response to Burma's
human rights violations:
Condemnation by U.N. bodies, monitoring, reporting, and widely-
publicized awards by international organizations and NGOs,
withholding of diplomatic relations, denials of loans and foreign
assistance, visa blacklists, domestic litigation, corporate withdrawals
and consumer boycotts [have all been imposed on Burma] .... i28
U.S. legislation authorizing sanctions describes the specific behavior
the United States condemns via sanctions. The ruling military regime,
the State Peace and Development Council ("SPDC"), failed to honor
the results of a free election held in 1990.129 Then, in 2003, the SPDC
"brutally attacked [democracy] supporters.., and arrested
democracy.., activists."'3 ° Further, the SPDC "continues egregious
human rights violations" such as torture, conscription of child soldiers,
ethnic cleansing against minorities in Burma, and the government-
sponsored use of forced and slave labor. 3' The sanctions will not be
lifted until, inter alia, "[t]he SPDC has made measurable ... progress
toward implementing a democratic Government including...
releasing all political prisoners; ... allowing freedom of speech and
124. Doxey, International Sanctions, supra note 110, at 45.
125. Gideon Rose, Haiti, in Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, supra
note 12, at 60.
126. Sarah Zaidi, Humanitarian Effects of the Coup and Sanctions in Haiti, in
Political Gain and Civilian Pain, supra note 114, at 189.
127. Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-61, §§ 1-9, 117
Stat. 864 (2003) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)).
128. Cleveland, supra note 3, at 19.
129. § 2(1), 117 Stat. at 864.
130. Id. § 2(4), 117 Stat. at 864.
131. Id. § 2(5)-(6), 117 Stat. at 864.
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the press;... allowing freedom of association;... [and] permitting the
peaceful exercise of religion."' 13 2
Like Haiti, but unlike Iraq and South Africa, Burma's economy and
public infrastructure on the eve of sanctions were already in ruins.133
In Burma, wealth was concentrated tightly in the hands of the ruling
military regime.'34 The ruling military junta monopolized benefits
from foreign trade and investment and spent an inordinate amount of
money on its military infrastructure rather than on public programs.'35
The five sanctions episodes described above have inspired both
criticism and praise from human rights scholars and advocates. Part II
addresses this tension.
II. THE TENSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
It seems odd to accuse economic sanctions of both jeopardizing and
strengthening international human rights law. And yet, this is
precisely what scholarship on economic sanctions does.'36 Until one
views this controversy, as this Note does in Part III, through the lens
of ESC rights versus civil and political rights, the controversy appears
irreconcilable.'37 Before Part III sheds new light on this dilemma, a
basic understanding of its underpinnings is necessary. To this end,
Part II.A provides an overview of scholarship that argues economic
sanctions jeopardize international human rights law, and Part II.B
describes scholarship that argues economic sanctions strengthen
international human rights law.
While digesting this conflict, it is important to bear in mind the
second-class citizen status of ESC rights in the eyes of the United
States. The United States has refused to ratify the ICESCR and
regards ESC rights as qualitatively different than political and civil
132. Id. § 3(3)(B), 117 Stat. at 864.
133. See Burma UN Service Off., Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma, &
The Burma Fund, The Crisis in Burma: An Agenda for the United Nations Security
Council? 4, 24, 28-29 (2003) [hereinafter Crisis in Burma]; see also Larry Jagan,
Deadlock in Burma, Asian Wall St. J., May 5, 2003, available at 2003 WL-WSJA
2688633 (discussing the low living standards, insufficient wages, and staggering
inflation in Burma).
134. See Alternative Asean Network on Burma, Ready, Aim, Sanctions: Special
Report 93 (2003), available at www.alstean.org/readyaimsanctionll2003.pdf
[hereinafter ALTSEAN]; see also Crisis in Burma, supra note 133, at 28-29.
135. See ALTSEAN, supra note 134, at 13.
136. Compare infra Part II.A (describing the arguments that economic sanctions
undermine international human rights law), with Part II.B (describing the arguments
that economic sanctions foster the growth of international human rights norms).
137. Sarah Cleveland's article does not directly analyze sanctions from this civil and
political versus ESC vantage point. She does, however, recognize that the use of
economic sanctions "may conflict with other fundamental rights." Cleveland, supra
note 3, at 6.
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rights, 3 ' despite the fact that sources of international human rights
law regard ESC rights as equally important and interrelated to civil
and political rights.139 In general, ESC rights have struggled to gain
the same credibility in international law as that enjoyed by civil and
political rights.1 4' Recall the Restatement's list of rights that have
ripened into CIL includes predominantly civil and political rights.
4 1
A. The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Civilians
Scholars have condemned economic sanctions for being inhumane
and destructive diplomatic measures that jeopardize human rights in
target countries. 2 Daoudi and Dajani, in their book about economic
sanctions, provide a harsh critique: "Like cancer, international
economic sanctions kill minute cells within the economic structure of
the target nation.' 1 43  Geoff Simons has summarized some of the
negative effects of economic sanctions on the population-at-large in
countries targeted by sanctions:
[T]o deny a nation the means to purify water or to treat sewage ...
encourage[s] the spread of disease .... To deny a nation access to
antiseptics, antibiotics and other essential medical supplies...
render[s] disease untreatable .... To deny people adequate
electricity for hospitals and factories, to deny people-including
pregnant women, babies, infants, the sick, the old-sufficient food
and clean water is... undeniably a gross violation of humanity.144
Others have criticized the very rationale behind sanctions as
inhumane and contrary to international human rights law. 4 5 Where
the expected scenario is that sanctions will cause severe civilian
suffering inspiring either guilt-driven reforms by the target's leaders
or the population-at-large to revolt in response, such sanctions are, by
definition, inhumane.
General economic sanctions have been criticized as blunt
mechanisms, analogous to blowing up an entire airplane with innocent
passengers on board to kill just one terrorist. 46 Richard Haass, in his
138. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
142. See infra Part III.A.
143. M.S. Daoudi & M.S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience 168
(1983).
144. Simons, supra note 118, at 33-34.
145. See, e.g., Fausey, supra note 101, at 200 ("In any event, in anticipating how the
sanctions will reach their goal, the U.N. intentionally expects to cause deprivation
within an entire population of a nation. This characteristic of sanctioning forms the
basis of the argument that collective sanction imposition may defy the U.N.
Charter.").
146. See Thomas G. Weiss et al., Introduction to Political Gain and Civilian Pain,
supra note 114, at 6.
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comprehensive book on U.S. economic sanctions notes: "Political
leaders and other elites often are able to shield themselves from the
worst effects of broad sanctions, something most of the population is
unable to do.1 47
Such criticism has led to the development of "smart" sanctions,
which focus on the specific individuals the United States wishes to
punish by narrowly tailoring sanctions to affect just these guilty few.'48
However, general economic sanctions are still commonly used by the
United States and others. This Note next highlights scholarship
critical of some of these specific sanctions regimes.
1. Poland
Critics have accused the Poland sanctions of causing hunger
problems among the population-at-large in Poland.'49 The sanctions
denied Poland a $740 million credit to buy U.S. corn, and Poland's
poultry industry depended largely on U.S. feed corn.15° According to
Hufbauer, in a country where chicken accounts for "10 percent of
each person's average consumption of 5.5 pounds of meat per month,"
such a denial obviously caused food shortages.5
2. South Africa
The sanctions against South Africa, combined with other factors,
reportedly caused a rise in unemployment. 5 2 One estimate shows
100,000 jobs were lost because of sanctions. 53 Neta Crawford, in an
analysis of the humanitarian consequences of the South Africa
sanctions, contends sanctions pushed "already vulnerable
populations.., over the edge into deeper suffering.' 1 54  The
vulnerable populations included destitute blacks, who made up almost
half of the country's unemployed. 55
3. Iraq
Less than a year after initial imposition of sanctions, Iraq had no
substantial food stockpiles-meat stockpiles were negligible, feed for
chickens was almost exhausted, and cooking oils and vegetables were
147. Haass, supra note 12, at 6.
148. Id.; see also Damrosch, Civilian Impact, supra note 106, at 279; Damrosch,
Collective Enforcement, supra note 106, at 74.
149. See infra notes 150-51.
150. 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 199.
151. Id.
152. Crawford, supra note 114, at 75-77.
153. Id. at 77.
154. Id. at 75.
155. Bill Keller, South Africa Sanctions May Have Worked, at a Price, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 12, 1993, at 168.
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in short supply.156 In the years following the Persian Gulf War, the
situation deteriorated further. The war completely devastated the
country, leaving the people in abject poverty with minimal
infrastructure. Then, according to Simons, the sanctions exacerbated
the problem. They blocked Iraq from importing much-needed food, a
serious impediment as prior to sanctions food imports had accounted
for seventy percent of national requirements.
15 7
After the Gulf War, international organizations warned of grave
humanitarian disasters in Iraq if then-present conditions were left
unassuaged. 158 For the duration of the sanctions policy, there were
reports of: "malnutrition, diarrhoea [sic] and dehydration among
children, [and] sick people being given contaminated drinking
water... "159 Simons reports children drinking contaminated water,
making them susceptible to "severe malnutrition, marasmus,
gastrointestinal illnesses and other diseases. 1 60 Despite such warnings
and reports, economic sanctions remained firmly in place,161 which,
according to critics, further contributed to the health crisis. The ban
on food imports was contributing to malnutrition by blocking the flow
of food into the starving country, 162 and the health situation for
children was particularly severe. The infant mortality rate tripled in
1991, the mortality rate for children under five nearly quadrupled,
1 63
and items such as baby food, incubators, and catheters for babies were
not allowed into the country. 61
4. Haiti
The Haiti sanctions have been similarly criticized for "wreaking
severe damage" on the country's civilian population.1 65 Among other
provisions, the sanctions suspended thirty million dollars in U.S. aid to
Haiti-money earmarked for public works projects "to build roads,
help farmers and improve medical care."' 66 The United States did
take steps to assuage the situation by maintaining a humanitarian
156. Simons, supra note 118, at 136-50; see also Hoskins, supra note 123, at 91, 106-
08, 113-16.
157. Simons, supra note 118, at 105-06; see also Hoskins, supra note 123, at 106-08,
113-16.
158. Simons, supra note 118, at 106; see also Hoskins, supra note 123, at 106-08,
113-16.
159. Simons, supra note 118, at 106.
160. Id. at 107; see also Hoskins, supra note 123, at 106-08, 113-16.
161. Simons, supra note 118, at 106.
162. Id. at 108-09.
163. Id. at 124.
164. Id. at 118.
165. Doxey, International Sanctions, supra note 110, at 46 (noting that while the
civilian populations suffered, the military leaders "suffered little and proved
unresponsive").
166. 2 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 603 (internal citations omitted).
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stream of money to nongovernmental organizations in Haiti. 67
Nonetheless, "[t]he U.S. cutoff of direct aid.., coupled with the
cancelled loans by multilateral organizations, cost Haiti $150 million,
economists say-the equivalent of the annual budget."'68 As a result,
prices nearly doubled, unemployment skyrocketed,'69  and the
minimum wage fell to three dollars a day in towns and less in rural
areas. 170
Reductions in spending also made food very expensive, reduced the
availability of medicine and medical supplies, stopped garbage
collection and the maintenance of sewage treatment plants, and
decreased the supply of drinking water. 171
5. Burma
Preliminary reports have indicated negative effects on the civilian
population of Burma as a result of the sanctions. 72 The sanctions
have already reportedly caused 400,000 layoffs in the textile industry,
and reports predict that 100,000 Burmese-mainly women working in
the textile industry-stand to lose their jobs as a result of sanctions,. 73
Many women who have already lost their jobs in the textile industry
have been forced into prostitution. 74 As Nicholas Kristof has pointed
out, this will cause many of these women to die from AIDS. 75
B. Economic Sanctions and the Growth of International Human
Rights Norms
Despite such harsh criticism of economic sanctions by scholars and
advocates, others have argued these same sanctions have strengthened
international human rights law by fostering the growth of
international human rights norms.
Professors Myres McDougal and W. Michael Reisman argue that
international norms are identified by how the world responds to
breaches of international law. 76 Accordingly, Sarah Cleveland, in her
article on sanctions and norm internalization, argues that sanctions, as
a form of diplomatic communication that responds to human rights
167. Zaidi, supra note 126, at 206-07.
168. 2 Hufbauer, supra note 93, at 603 (internal quotations omitted).
169. Doxey, International Sanctions, supra note 110, at 46.
170. 2 Hufbauer, supra note 93, at 603-04.
171. Zaidi, supra note 126, at 199-205.
172. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
173. Nicholas D. Kristof, Editorial, Our Man in Havana, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2003,
at A15.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Cleveland, supra note 3, at 6-7 (discussing Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of
Treaties and Other Formal International Acts on the Customary Law of Human Rights,
25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 99, 100 (1995-1996)).
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violations by another state, "contribute[] to the development and
identification of international rules." 177 Cleveland argues that
''economic sanctions have an importance beyond their classical role in
seeking to punish and alter a foreign state's behavior-that of
assisting in the international definition, promulgation, recognition,
and domestic internalization of human rights norms."17
The imposition of economic sanctions also fosters norm
internalization, which subsequently contributes to the establishment
of international human rights norms. 7 9 Norm internalization occurs
when states use international law as the basis for domestic policies.""
According to Harold Koh, "[lt]o the extent that those norms are
successfully internalized, they become future determinants of why
nations obey" international laws."8 '
Along these lines, Cleveland argues economic sanctions encourage
norm internalization within the target country by encouraging it to
comply with international human rights treaties.182 Where economic
sanctions are imposed to coerce a government to change its human
rights policies, and the government capitulates or at least makes some
concessions in its policies in response to sanctions, it is incorporating
human rights into its domestic policies. 83
Cleveland provides the example of Burma to illustrate how
economic sanctions contribute to international human rights norms.
The Burma sanctions have drawn substantial international attention
to the human rights violations in Burma, mainly to speech and labor
violations. 14  U.S. economic sanctions have not only expressed
condemnation in their own right, but have also spurred sanctions by
other countries, regional organizations, and international
organizations.8 In Cleveland's view, the combined effect of these
sanctions has brought "substantial international attention, pressure,
and condemnation to bear on the Burmese regime .... All of these
actions form part of a collective effort on the part of the international
community to refine existing human rights norms and to promote
177. Id. at 7; see also Damrosch, Collective Enforcement, supra note 106, at 61-62
("Scholars who have scrutinized sanctions from a moral or legal perspective have
underscored the important contribution that sanctions can make to reinforcement of
international norms . .
178. Id. at 6.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 Yale L.J. 2599, 2646 (1997) (internal citations omitted)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 6-7.
184. Id. at 19.
185. Id. ("The response to the human riahts crisis in Burma illustrates [howl ...
U.S. unilateral measures and diplomatic efforts to earner international support have
plaved a catalytic role in broadening and deepening the global response [to human
rights violations in Burma].").
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improved human rights conditions and democratic governance in
Burma." '186 As a result, sanctions have helped "define and clarify
international norms prohibiting forced labor and promoting
democracy and free speech."' 8 7
Moreover, when countries, such as the United States, respond to
human rights violations in Burma, they are incorporating ideas of
international human rights law into their domestic institutions.18
Similarly, when Burma responds to economic sanctions, as it has in
several limited circumstances, 89 it is internalizing international human
rights standards into its domestic system.' 9°
III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS BUT WEAKEN ESC RIGHTS
The controversy described in Part II is enough to cause cerebral
apoplexy. How can a single act both bolster and violate international
human rights law? Luckily, simply focusing on the dichotomy
between the two sets of international human rights-civil and political
versus ESC rights-adds clarity. Under this new light, economic
sanctions strengthen civil and political rights but undermine ESC
rights. Part III.A places economic sanctions under the lens of the two
sets of rights and uses the case studies to illustrate how sanctions
undergird civil and political rights but weaken ESC rights. Part III.B
recommends strategies for assuaging the negative effects of economic
sanctions on ESC rights.
A. Viewing the Controversy in the Context of the Dichotomy Between
Civil and Political and ESC Rights
As described in Part II.B, economic sanctions foster the
development of international human rights norms by articulating
human rights violations as the impetus for imposing sanctions and
thereby contributing to state practice. However, human rights
violations mentioned in sanctions legislation have been primarily of a
civil and political nature. Thus, sanctions primarily reinforce the
strength of civil and political rights in international human rights law.
Unfortunately, in the process of bolstering these civil and political
rights, U.S. sanctions have been severely criticized for causing
suffering among the population-at-large of the target country. This
186. Id.
187. Id. at 20.
188. See id. They do this "by incorporatini, into their systems an awareness of
international human rights standards and Burma's noncompliance with those
standards." Id.
189. Id. at 19 (describine some of the resDonses bv the Burmese eovernment).
190. Id. at 20 ("The effort also has produced incremental transnational norm
internalization bv encourain2 Burma to accept international treaty obligations and
modestly alter its human rights conduct .... ).
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suffering, if articulated in rights-based language, mainly implicates
ESC rights.
Part III.A.1 demonstrates how sanctions have reinforced civil and
political rights, and Part III.A.2 describes how the detrimental effects
of each sanctions policy implicates ESC rights.
1. Sanctions Build Up International Civil and Political Human Rights
Norms
Sanctions contribute to and advance respect for international
human rights law by defining and reinforcing international human
rights norms. 91 When the United States responds with sanctions to a
violation of international human rights law, it reinforces a
commitment to international norms that such behavior is
unacceptable. 192 Because the United States usually uses sanctions to
express displeasure regarding violations of civil and political rights, it
is bolstering the normalization of this class of rights.193
Arguments made by scholars in Part II.B that economic sanctions
are examples of state practice are compelling, especially in light of the
Restatement's definition of state practice. 94 For example, sanctions
are national laws that incorporate human rights provisions-the U.S.
Congress passes legislation authorizing or implementing sanctions to
punish human rights violations in a target country.95 In addition,
sanctions are a diplomatic communication by a state expressing the
view that certain target actions violate international human rights
law.
196
Similarly, the imposition of economic sanctions helps normalize the
idea that states have obligations to do something about civil and
political human rights violations perpetrated against citizens of other
countries.'97
a. Sanctions Reinforce the Substantive Content of Civil and Political
Human Rights Norms
Because international norms are created through state practice, the
use of state-sponsored economic sanctions to discipline human rights
violators contributes to the development of international law. As a
result, the United States' frequent use of economic sanctions since
191. Id. at 5.
192. Haass, supra note 12, at 2.
193. It is not, however, providing this same service to ESC rights. See infra Part
III.A.2 (arguing economic sanctions weaken ESC rights).
194. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
195. Cf Cleveland, supra note 3, at 71 (arguing that economic sanctions build CIL
but not referring specifically to the Restatement's definition of state practice).
196. Cf. id. (same).
197. Again, ESC rights are not similarly benefited.
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World War II to achieve human rights goals has contributed to the
state practice necessary to establish human rights norms.
Accordingly, by contributing to a significant portion of the requisite
state practice, the United States is able to ensure its foreign-policy
bias is reflected in developing norms-recall the U.S. preference for
civil and political rights.9 s In fact, U.S. economic sanctions have been
employed, almost without exception, to punish violations of civil and
political rights.' 99 Therefore, economic sanctions do not generally
build norms that require respect for all international human rights, but
instead build up norms that focus mainly on civil and political rights
such as those codified in the ICCPR.2 °°
The following cases are presented to illustrate this phenomenon. In
each, the goals of the U.S. sanctions policies are predominantly civil
and political. It is important to note that in each case, the target
government could also have been, or could be accused of, violations of
ESC rights.
i. Poland
The goals of the U.S. sanctions against Poland were to "free those
in arbitrary detention, to lift martial law, and to restore the
internationally recognized rights of the Polish people to free speech
and association.""2 1 It is easy to categorize these rights as civil and
political by comparing them to provisions of the ICCPR. ICCPR
Article 9, for example, guarantees liberty and that "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. ''2°2 Article 19 guarantees
freedom of expression which includes free speech: "Everyone shall
have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information ... either orally, in
writing or in print. .... ,203 Finally, Article 22 proclaims, "[e]veryone
shall have the right to freedom of association.. .. ,,211 Thus, in the
Polish sanctions, civil and political rights are clearly reinforced.
ii. South Africa
The South Africa sanctions called for the release of all political
prisoners and those detained without trial, the lifting of the ban on
democratic political parties, the right to express political opinions, the
198. See supra Part I.B.
199. See infra Parts III.A.la.i-vi.
200. See infra Part III.A.la.vi.
201. 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 196 (quoting from President Reagan's
Christmas 1981 address (internal citations omitted)); see supra notes 110-112 and
accompanying text.
202. 1CCPR, supra note 19, art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
203. Id. art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
204. Id. art. 22, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
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repeal of discriminatory measures, and efforts to make the political
process more representative.2 5 Again, the civil and political rights
implications are quite clear-cut. Holding political prisoners and
people detained without trial violates, among other provisions, the
liberty provisions found mainly in ICCPR Article 9, which bars
arbitrary detention for grounds other than those established by law
and prohibits detention without "proceedings before a court...
without delay .. ."206 In addition, denying expression of political
opinions implicates ICCPR Article 19(2).207 Further, the
discriminatory measures of Apartheid violated the general proviso in
ICCPR Article 2(1) that requires all rights recognized in the covenant
to be upheld "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
20 8
iii. Sanctions Against Iraq
The Iraq sanctions were imposed to get Saddam Hussein to
withdraw from Kuwait, and to "condemn[ ] ... gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights in Kuwait, including
widespread arrests, torture, summary executions, and mass
extrajudicial killings. '29 ICCPR Article 7 prohibits torture.210  The
extra judicial killings and summary executions violate ICCPR Article
6(1), which prohibits arbitrary deprivation of the right to life21' and
Article 14, which requires a "fair and public hearing., 212 Thus, as in
Poland and South Africa, the rights the U.S. sought to redress by
sanctions in Iraq were mainly civil and political.
iv. Haiti
The Haiti sanctions aimed at forcing a military coup to step aside
and restore Aristide to power.2 3 The coup had caused "extrajudicial
executions, disappearances, torture, rape, limitations on freedom of
association and assembly, and disruption in personal and professional
activities."2"4 As is probably clear by now, the majority of the named
offenses clearly implicate the civil and political rights codified in the
205. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
206. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
207. Id. art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
208. Id. art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173; see also id. art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
209. 101 Pub. L. No. 513, § 596A(7), 104 Stat. 2048 (1990) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1701 (2000)); see supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
210. ICCPR, supra note 199, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
211. Id. art. 6(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
212. Id. art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
213. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
214. Zaidi, supra note 126, at 189.
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ICCPR, and the official U.S. policy implementing the sanctions names
predominantly civil and political rights as impetus for sanctions.215
v. Burma
The Burma sanctions were imposed to condemn the SPDC's attack
and arrest of democracy supporters and activists, and for other human
rights violations such as torture, conscription of child soldiers, ethnic
cleansing against minorities in Burma, and the government-sponsored
use of forced and slave labor.216 The sanctions call upon the Burmese
government to release political prisoners, allow freedom of speech
and the press, allow freedom of association, and to permit free
exercise of religion.2"'
Most of the violations listed in the text of the Burma sanctions are
core ICCPR rights. The arrest and continued detention of democracy
activists and other political prisoners implicates liberty rights
enshrined in Articles 9 through 15 of the ICCPR,218 such as the right
to be free from arbitrary detention1 9 and the right "to a fair and
public hearing by... [an] impartial tribunal.""22  Article 7 of the
ICCPR prohibits torture,221 Article 8 prohibits slave or forced labor,2
and Article 18 guarantees freedom of thought and religion. 23 The
ICCPR also calls for freedom of expression, freedom of association,
and the right of peaceful assembly224 -rights the SPDC infringes upon
by arresting pro-democracy activists and continuing to hold and arrest
political prisoners because of their political views. 25
vi. Summary of the Case Studies
All five cases discussed above were provided as samples to illustrate
the idea that U.S. economic sanctions bolster civil and political rights.
In each case, it was fairly clear; the rights mentioned in the text of the
legislation are violations of civil and political rights codified in the
ICCPR. If all U.S. sanctions policies imposed with human rights goals
were examined, they would be further evidence of this same
215. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
218. ICCPR, supra note 19, arts. 9-15, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175-77.
219. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
220. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176-77.
221. Id. art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
222. Id. art. 8, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
223. Id. art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
224. Id. arts. 21-22, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
225. Moreover, Burma's forced conscription of child soldiers violates Article 24,
which affords special protection to juveniles. Id. art. 24, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
However, as discussed infra Part III.B.2.e, this right cuts across both covenants, and
could therefore be construed as a small nod to economic and social rights.
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phenomenon.226 In other words, these cases were not chosen because
they are anomalous and bolster the main thrust of this Note. On the
contrary, they were selected because they are quite ordinary and
represent the norm for how and why the United States imposes
sanctions for human rights goals. As a result, U.S. sanctions have at
least some positive effects on international law. They build civil and
political human rights norms.
b. Sanctions Reinforce Human Rights Beyond the Waters Edge-But
Only for Civil and Political Rights
In addition to bolstering support for the substantive content of civil
and political rights, economic sanctions assist the burgeoning idea that
states have obligations with regard to human rights beyond national
borders. Recall, the ICCPR specifically precludes extraterritorial
application of its obligations through Article 2(1).227 As discussed
above, however, states can become obligated to more than is
expressed in international human rights documents if a right ripens
into CIL through state practice. 28 Economic sanctions, as a form of
state practice, water down this territorial limitation.
Economic sanctions are a response to extraterritorial human rights
violations, and they are a response that has come often and with
increasing frequency since the Cold War. The United States alone has
imposed economic sanctions more than twenty times for human rights
purposes and, overall, more than eighty-five times between 1996 and
2001.229 Thus, the United States is establishing a precedent through its
consistent use of economic sanctions that human rights violations
abroad are our concern, and states should do something about
extraterritorial violations.230
For example, the Burma sanctions were imposed by the United
States to punish human rights violations in Burma committed against
Burmese citizens.23' Similarly, the Poland sanctions were imposed by
226. See generally 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93; 2 id.
227. See ICCPR, supra note 19, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
228. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
229. Kristof, supra note 173.
230. To bolster this argument of general practice, economic sanctions have been
around since ancient Greece. See Simons, supra note 118, at 174-211 (describing the
Megarian decree, an early example of economic sanctions, enacted by Pericles in 432
BC). And other countries continue to resort to economic sanctions. See generally 1
Hufbauer et al., supra note 93. Thus, sufficient "widespread practice" has perhaps
already been established with regard to this proposition. If so, this would make the
idea that civil and political rights should be protected extraterritorially a jus cogens
norm. Cf. Simons, supra note 118, at 35 (quoting a U.S. official that making U.S.
sanctions binding on international branches of U.S. banks was easily done because "a
norm of customary international law has been created that recognizes the validity of
extraterritoriality in such circumstances").
231. See supra Part I.E.5.
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the United States to punish human rights abuses in Poland against
Polish citizens.232
Unfortunately, sanctions do not similarly benefit ESC rights, and as
shown below, economic sanctions actually weaken respect for ESC
rights.
2. Sanctions Weaken ESC Rights
Because economic sanctions are a form of state practice, when the
United States imposes economic sanctions and fails to take into
account or even try to prevent dire civilian consequences that
implicate ESC rights, it is weakening these rights. Such actions foster
the growth of the idea that ESC rights are irrelevant, and that
jeopardizing ESC rights for civil and political goals is perfectly
acceptable.
a. Sanctions Undermine the Substantive Content of Economic and
Social Rights
Geoff Simons has summarized some of the negative effects of
economic sanctions on the population-at-large in countries targeted
by sanctions.233 If economic sanctions have such effects, they not only
cause undeniable "violation[s] of humanity," '234 but also directly
implicate international human rights obligations found in the
ICESCR. Sanctions would violate, for example, the right to health,
which requires "the improvement of all aspects of environmental and
industrial hygiene; the prevention, treatment and control of...
diseases; [and] the creation of conditions" to ensure medical services
to all "in the event of sickness."
235
This Note next provides examples where economic sanctions have
allegedly had such deleterious effects on target nations.236
i. U.S. Sanctions Against Poland
As noted above, In Poland, economic sanctions denied Poland a
$740 million credit to buy U.S. corn.237 Poland's poultry industry
232. See supra Part I.E.1.
233. See supra note 144.
234. Simons, supra note 118, at 34.
235. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. at 8.
236. There are obviously problems with causation in each case. Because this is the
real world and not a laboratory, holding all other variables constant is impossible.
However, taking this into consideration, it is still possible to see how economic
sanctions contribute to the described circumstances. See Crawford, supra note 114, at
59-60 (discussing causation problems); see also Zaidi, supra note 126, at 200
(discussing problems with establishing causation and with finding reliable data).
237. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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depended largely on U.S. feed corn. 3 ' In a country where "[c]hicken
accounts for 10 percent of each person's average consumption of 5.5
pounds of meat per month" such a denial caused food shortages.
23 9 If
this effect can be attributed clearly to the sanctions policy,2 4 it would
implicate the right to food provisions of the ICESCR 41
ii. U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa
As noted above, the sanctions against South Africa, combined with
other factors, reportedly caused a rise in unemployment and the loss
of 100,000 jobs.242 Critics of the South Africa sanctions contend the
sanctions may have pushed "already vulnerable populations.., over
the edge into deeper suffering... ,,243 The vulnerable populations
included destitute blacks, who made up almost half of the country's
unemployed.4  Such effects would jeopardize right to work
provisions of the ICESCR,24 5  and because blacks were
disproportionately hurt, would also violate Article 2(2) barring
discrimination with regard to ESC rights.246
iii. U.S. Sanctions Against Iraq
U.S. sanctions against Iraq have been widely criticized for their
disproportionate impact on the Iraqi population-at-large.247 As noted
above, such effects implicate many of the fundamental ESC rights
codified in the ICESCR; the right to food, for example, found in
Article 11 of the covenant. 24 Less than a year after initial imposition
of sanctions, Iraq had no substantial food stockpiles-meat stockpiles
were negligible, feed for chickens was almost exhausted, and cooking
oils and vegetables were in short supply.2 49 In the years following the
Persian Gulf War, the situation deteriorated further.2 0  The war
completely devastated the country leaving the people in abject
poverty with minimal infrastructure .2 1 The sanctions exacerbated the
problem because they blocked Iraq from importing much-needed
food-a serious impediment because in the period prior to sanctions
238. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
239. 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 199.
240. 1 Id. at 199-200 (noting the possible role of Polish farmers in the poultry
shortage).
241. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 11, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
242. See supra notes 152-53.
243. Crawford, supra note 114, at 75.
244. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
245. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 6, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
246. See id. art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 5.
247. See supra notes 156-64.
248. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 11, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
249. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
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food imports had accounted for seventy percent of national
requirements.252
The Iraq sanctions also implicate health rights as embodied in
Article 12 of the covenant.253 Iraqis were drinking contaminated
water, making them more susceptible to disease. 4  Because the
health implications were particularly severe for children,255 Article 10
is implicated as well, which requires special protection for children. 6
Article 10 also requires special protection for mothers before and
after childbirth257-the sanctions blocked some medical supplies useful
for women in labor as well as other vital medical supplies.258
iv. U.S. Sanctions Against Haiti
The Haiti sanctions cost Haiti the equivalent of its national budget,
prices nearly doubled, unemployment skyrocketed, and the minimum
wage fell to three dollars a day in towns and less in rural areas.21
9
Such effects most clearly jeopardize Article 6 of the ICESCR, which
ensures the right to work and to be paid fair wages.
260
The reduction in government spending combined with the loss of
U.S. aid intended for public works projects made food very expensive,
reduced the availability of medicine and medical supplies, stopped
garbage collection and the maintenance of sewage treatment plants,
and decreased the supply of drinking water.261 Such effects implicate
several ICESCR provisions. The problems with sanitation and clean
drinking water and the reduced availability of medicine violate the
right to health guarantees found in Article 12: "States Parties...
recognize the right of everyone to the.., highest attainable standard
of... health," and pledge to take steps "necessary for.., the
improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial
hygiene .... 262 The food shortages violate Article 11, which
recognizes "the right of everyone to... adequate food... [and] to be
free from hunger.
263
252. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
253. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. at 8.
254. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
256. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 10, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
257. See id.
258. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
260. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 6, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
261. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
262. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. at 8.
263. Id. art. 11, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
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v. Burma Sanctions
Like Haiti, but unlike Iraq and South Africa, Burma's economy and
public infrastructure on the eve of sanctions, were already in ruins.2M
As noted above, prior to sanctions, South Africa had a dynamic
economy on which other countries in the region depended-though
seventy-five percent of wealth was concentrated in the hands of only
twenty percent of the population.265 Similarly, Iraq prior to sanctions
''was a relatively prosperous nation with a sophisticated health and
welfare system,... and ample food and water., 266  In Burma,
however, wealth was concentrated tightly in the hands of the ruling
military regime. The regime monopolized benefits from foreign trade
and investment and spent an inordinate amount of money on its
military infrastructure rather than on public programs. 267 Therefore,
causation is obviously more difficult in the Burma situation
concomitant with the lack of historical perspective on the sanctions-
enhanced sanctions were only imposed in July 2003.268
As Kristof has noted, however, preliminary reports have indicated a
negative effect on civilians in Burma as a result of the sanctions; for
example, 400,000 layoffs (mainly among women in the textile
industry).269 This effect implicates the right to work found in Article 6
of the ICESCR, which "includes the right of everyone to the
opportunity to gain [her] living by work which [she] freely chooses,"
and that state parties should take steps to protect this right.270
Imposing economic sanctions that cost thousands of jobs is essentially
the opposite of taking steps to safeguard this employment right, but
instead is directly interfering with the right; in other words, a frowned
upon retrogressive measure.271
Kristof has predicted that many of these women who lost their jobs
and have since resorted to prostitution will die from AIDS. 27 2 If this
occurs, it would implicate Article 7(b), which calls for healthy work
conditions,273 and it would also violate right to health guarantees from
Article 12, including 12(2)(c), calling for specific steps to be taken
with regard to "the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic,
endemic, [and] occupational... diseases .... "274 AIDS, a global
epidemic, certainly fits the bill.
264. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
266. Simons, supra note 118, at 107.
267. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
270. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 6, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
271. See supra note 57 (discussing the prohibition against retrogressive measures).
272. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
273. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 7(b), 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
274. See id. art. 12(2)(c), 993 U.N.T.S. at 8.
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b. Sanctions Contribute to Disrespect for ESC Rights at Home and
Abroad
Unlike the ICCPR that requires state parties to ensure rights
specifically within their own territories or subject to their
sovereignty,7 5 the ICESCR requires state parties to take steps
"individually and through international assistance and co-operation"
to ensure fulfillment of the relevant rights.276 Unfortunately, the
frequent imposition of economic sanctions that thwart ESC rights in
other countries weakens this language by building customary law to
the contrary.277 Therefore, rather than fostering the norm that
countries should cooperate with other countries to aid fulfillment of
ICESCR obligations, the frequent imposition of economic sanctions
reinforces the idea that states not only do not have to take steps
domestically to assist these rights, but also can jeopardize these rights
in other countries with no repercussions.
Part III.B recommends a two-pronged course of action for creating
economic sanctions that no longer hinder the development of ESC
rights.
B. Putting Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in U.S. Sanctions
Policy
It is time for the United States to send a message to the world that
civilized nations should not contribute to poverty, hunger, and poor
health conditions through economic sanctions. To do so, the United
States must take the following course of action: (1) It must only
employ narrowly targeted smart sanctions, thus affirming the idea that
ESC rights cannot be subjugated to civil and political goals; and (2)
The United States must articulate its sanctions policies using ESC-
rights language in order to give credence to ESC rights. Such
measures will nurture the development of ESC rights into CIL and
help garner respect for the notion that countries are obligated to
respect these rights both domestically and extraterritorially.
275. See ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
276. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
277. See supra Part II.A (discussing the effects of economic sanctions on civilians);
Part III.A.2.a (explaining that these negative effects implicate mainly ESC rights).
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1. Only Impose Smart Sanctions
First, the United States should only impose smart sanctions. 78
Smart sanctions are narrowly tailored to minimize civilian suffering
through measures such as visa denials and the freezing of assets.279
This will prevent or at least minimize violations of ESC rights in target
countries.8 ' The United States should formalize this foreign policy
decision by articulating it clearly in legislation authorizing sanctions.
In this way, the United States will contribute to state practice that
pays homage to, and consequently strengthens, ESC rights.
The United States should not be averse to recognizing ESC rights in
this manner because it would be acknowledging more U.S.-centric
negative elements of ESC rights. The United States would be
condemning the imposition of sanctions (a state action) that harms
ESC rights. This allows the United States to skirt sticky issues
surrounding positive aspects of ESC rights. 8
2. Impose Sanctions for Violations of ESC Rights
Second, the United States should include ESC rights as official
reasons for implementing sanctions. This would simply entail adding
language that acknowledges ESC rights violations are also occurring
in the target state, and thus, the United States is imposing sanctions to
protect these rights in addition to the usual civil and political goals.
If the United States finds the entitlement aspects of ESC rights
completely distasteful, 28 2 it can simply choose to cite more negative
aspects of ESC rights in its sanctions policies.283 Obviously, it would
be preferable to build full-fledged respect for comprehensive ESC
278. Cf Fausey, supra note 101, at 197 (arguing U.N. sanctions should target "those
controlling the behavior of the nation," and therefore "most likely meant to be
influenced by [sanctions]" (internal quotations omitted)); Richard N. Haass,
Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations, in Economic Sanctions and American
Diplomacy, supra note 12, at 197, 207 (recommending that sanctions "should focus to
the extent possible on those responsible for the offending behavior").
279. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
280. This recommendation is particularly pertinent in light of the many sanctions
studies that conclude sanctions are rarely effective in achieving their goals. See
Daoudi & Dajani, supra note 143, at 168 (considering the consensus regarding the
ineffectiveness of sanctions); 1 Hufbauer et al., supra note 93, at 12 ("Sanctions often
do not succeed in changing the behavior of foreign countries."). How can we justify a
blunt tool like general economic sanctions when such sanctions usually do not even
work? See Damrosch, Collective Enforcement, supra note 106, at 74 ("The
overwhelming impression remains that internationally sponsored sanctions have had
the perverse effects of enriching the targeted elites, while simultaneously causing ever
greater impoverishment of civilian populations.").
281. See supra notes 52-62 (discussing difficulties in assessing positive rights
violations and gauging whether a state party is doing enough to progressively realize
ESC rights).
282. See supra Part I.B (discussing U.S. aversion to ESC rights).
283. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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rights, but nurturing the negative analogues of ESC rights would be a
step in the right direction.
The following cases illustrate the type of ESC rights that could have
been included in U.S. sanctions regimes. The list of possible ESC
rights for each case is by no means exhaustive but serves to provide a
brief taste of how ESC rights can be included in sanctions legislation.
a. Poland
Though not mentioned as an official impetus for economic
sanctions, ESC rights violations were also occurring in Poland that
could have been listed by the United States in its sanctions policy.
Poland had outlawed the Solidarity labor union,2" and according to
ICESCR, Article 8(1)(a), everyone has the right "to form trade
unions and join the trade union of his choice. ... "285 If the United
States addressed such a violation in its sanctions legislation, it would
be condemning a government action-Poland outlawed a labor
union-rather than an entitlement ESC right.
Also, Poland, in general, was not able to meet the "economic
needs" of its people.286 This could encompass numerous provisions of
the ICESCR. Article 6, for example, requires state parties to ensure
the right to work, remuneration, fair wages, and workers' ability to "a
decent living for themselves and their families." '287 Realistically, the
United States would be less apt to address this pure entitlement right
where it was Poland's failure to act rather than a specific incompatible
commission at issue.
b. South Africa
As was the case in Poland, the United States could have cited
violations of ESC rights as a reason for imposing sanctions on South
Africa. Notably, the discriminatory practices of Apartheid affected
work, culture, education, and health.288 All are within the scope of the
ICESCR,289 which contains a general provision identical to ICCPR
Article 2(1)290 that prohibits discrimination.29 ' Discrimination with
regard to ESC rights is an incompatible state commission (a violation
of a negative right), rather than a step states are required to
284. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
285. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 8(1)(a), 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
286. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
287. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 6, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
288. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
289. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 6, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6 (recognizing the right to
work); id. art. 15(a), at 9 (recognizing the right to take part in cultural life); id. art. 12,
993 U.N.T.S. at 8 (recognizing the right to health).
290. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
291. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
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progressively achieve (a violation of a positive right).292 Therefore,
this is another example of a negative ESC right that the United States
would be more prone to accept in its sanctions policy.
c. Iraq
According to Eric Hoskins in his assessment of pre-sanctions Iraq:
Iraq's investment in its own economic and social development had a
visible effect on the living conditions and health status of the civilian
population. Iraq's medical facilities and public health system were
well developed .... By 1990, nearly all urban dwellers and 72
percent of rural residents had access to clean water, while 93 percent
of Iraqis had access to health services.
293
However, even though Iraq, in general, may have been providing
adequate health care, chemical warfare against the Kurds294 violated
health rights guaranteed by Article 12.295 In addition, the ICESCR
encompasses a wider range of rights than health and access to clean
water.296 Thus, it would probably be a short search to find possible
ESC rights violations, which the United States could have mentioned
in its sanctions legislation. The gassing of the Kurds, for example,
could also violate Article 15(1)(a), which recognizes the right of
everyone to "take part in cultural life." '297 Warfare singled out a
cultural group and thus, arguably, denied members of the group their
right to take part in cultural life. The sanctions might also have
utilized Article 2(2) prohibiting discrimination with regard to ESC
rights.298 Here again, the gassing of the Kurds is a state commission
incompatible with ESC rights, which would place the United States in
the safe territory of more negative ESC rights.299
292. For a discussion of the distinction between negative and positive rights, see
supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
293. Hoskins, supra note 123, at 92.
294. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
295. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. at 8.
296. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing some of the main rights included in the
ICESCR).
297. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 15(1)(a), 993 U.N.T.S. at 9.
298. Id. art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
299. The gassing of the Kurds could also implicate Article 27 of the ICCPR: "In
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging
to such minorities shall not be denied the right ... to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." ICCPR, supra
note 19, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. Gassing the Kurds, an ethnic minority in Iraq,
quashes their ability to enjoy these rights.
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d. Haiti
There were ESC human rights violations occurring in Haiti as
well.3" "The disruption in personal and professional activities""3 1
mentioned by Zaidi violated ESC rights by impeding the right to
work3 2 and the right to take part in cultural life.3" 3 Here again, the
violations invoke negative aspects of ESC rights.
And because Haiti is one of the most impoverished countries in the
western hemisphere,3 4 violations of ICESCR Article 11, which
recognizes the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to
be free from hunger,30 5 could also have been mentioned by the United
States in its sanctions legislation. However, because such violations
require recognition of entitlement aspects of ESC rights-Haiti's
failure to provide food for its citizens-recommending the United
States include this in its sanctions policy is a bit unrealistic.
e. Burma
The U.S. sanctions legislation's list of human rights violations
occurring in Burma is by no means extensive. Myriad other human
rights violations have occurred there,30 6 some of which implicate ESC
rights. Although the drafters overlooked many ESC rights, the
Burma sanctions do give minimal credence to ESC rights by focusing
on labor rights and child soldiers30 '-rights areas that cut across both
covenants. ICCPR Article 8 prohibits slave and forced labor,"" and
ICESCR Article 7 calls upon states to ensure decent working
conditions and remuneration.3 9
The language used by the United States in its sanctions policy
categorizes labor rights more under the lens of negative rights by
condemning the Burmese government's actions against its people
rather than calling upon it to ensure better working conditions.310
Similarly, with regard to child soldiers, the U.S. sanctions color the
violations as negative rights by criticizing the Burmese government's
conscription of children rather than its failure to take measures to
protect children.311 Therefore, the Burma sanctions, at least in this
regard, provide a good example of how the United States could
300. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
301. See Zaidi, supra note 126.
302. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 6, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
303. Id. art. 15(1)(a), 993 U.N.T.S. at 9.
304. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
305. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 11, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
306. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
308. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 8, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
309. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 7,993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
310. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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acknowledge ESC rights and remain within the safe territory of
negative rights. Ideally, the United States could find a way to go
further with ESC rights and recognize some positive aspects that seem
particularly reasonable. For example, it could color the use of child
soldiers as a failure to take "[s]pecial measures ... on behalf of all
children." to protect them "from economic and social exploitation" as
required by the ICESCR.312
CONCLUSION
Economic sanctions have caused suffering in Poland,313 South
Africa,314 Iraq,3"5 Haiti,3" 6 and Burma317 in ways that disproportionately
implicate ESC rights.3"8 Because these sanctions serve as state
practice, which builds international human rights norms, imposing
them in this fashion undermines ESC rights and retards their growth
into widely recognized and easy-to-enforce human rights. To rectify
this, the United States must design sanctions policies that
acknowledge the importance of ESC rights and minimize human
suffering.
Ideally, the United States should ratify the ICESCR. But this is not
very realistic unless we can resurrect Roosevelt and revitalize his
visionary second bill of rights.3" 9 Therefore, the recommendations
made in this Note represent a less overt way for the United States to
recognize the importance of ESC rights while continuing to utilize a
favored tool of U.S. foreign policy. Everybody wins-the United
States can still fight human rights abuses with economic sanctions, the
population-at-large of the target country can receive relief from
human rights abuses, and ESC rights will no longer suffer in the
shadow of civil and political rights.
312. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 10, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
313. See supra Part II.A.1.
314. See supra Part II.A.2.
315. See supra Part II.A.3.
316. See supra Part II.A.4.
317. See supra Part II.A.5.
318. See supra Part III.A.2.
319. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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